Privacy-Preserving Smart Parking System Using Blockchain and Private
  Information Retrieval by Amiri, Wesam Al et al.
Privacy-Preserving Smart Parking System Using
Blockchain and Private Information Retrieval
Wesam Al Amiri∗, Mohamed Baza∗, Karim Banawan†, Mohamed Mahmoud∗,
Waleed Alasmary‡, Kemal Akkaya§
∗Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee Tech University, Cookeville, TN, USA
†Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University, Alexandria, Egypt
‡Department of Computer Engineering, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah, Saudi Arabia
§Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA
Abstract—Searching for available parking spaces is a major
problem for drivers in big cities, causing traffic congestion and
air pollution, and wasting drivers’ time. Smart parking systems
enable drivers to solicit real-time parking information and book
parking slots. However, current smart parking systems require
drivers to disclose their sensitive information, such as their desired
destinations. Moreover, existing schemes are centralized which
makes them vulnerable to bottlenecks and single point of failure
problems and privacy breaches by service providers. In this paper,
we propose a privacy-preserving smart parking system using
blockchain and private information retrieval. First, a consortium
blockchain is created by different parking lot owners to ensure
security, transparency, and availability of the parking offers. Then,
to preserve the drivers’ location privacy, we adopt private informa-
tion retrieval technique to privately retrieve parking offers from
blockchain nodes. In addition, a short randomizable signature
is used to allow drivers to authenticate for reserving available
parking slots from parking owners anonymously. Our evaluations
demonstrate that our proposed scheme preserves drivers’ privacy
with low communication and computation overheads.
Index Terms—Smart parking, blockchain, security and privacy
preservation, and private information retrieval.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the fast-growing number of vehicles over the past few
years, finding a vacant parking space has become a major
problem for drivers in big cities. According to [1], searching
for a vacant parking space leads to an average of 30 percent
of traffic congestion. In addition, 47,000 gallons of gasoline
are consumed which produces 728 tons of carbon dioxide on
average per year in Los Angeles area alone [2]. Consequently,
technology should be used to help drivers find and book vacant
parking slots to avoid traffic congestion [3], air pollution, and
wasting drivers’ times [4].
Due to the advancement in wireless communications and
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart parking system has
been emerging as an efficient solution to finding a parking slot.
In smart parking system, an IoT device is installed in each
parking spot and uses an ultrasonic sensor to detect whether
a certain parking spot is available or not. Hence, it provides
occupancy status of parking spaces to a service provider. The
service provider enables drivers to check the available parking
spaces and make online reservations, which facilitates finding
vacant parking spaces.
Despite the aforementioned benefits of smart parking sys-
tems, they impose several challenges that need to be addressed
before widely deploying them. One major concern is the
privacy of drivers’ information. The current systems require the
drivers to disclose sensitive information, such as real identities,
destinations, and reservation times to the service provider. Thus,
the service provider can infer drivers’ daily activities and life
patterns such as home/work address, health condition, income
level, etc. By analyzing the data it receives along with back-
ground information [5]. Moreover, the existing smart parking
systems are usually centralized which suffer from several limi-
tations [6]–[8]. First, they are prone to an inherent single point
of failure problem. Second, they are vulnerable to distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks and remote hijacking attacks,
which could make the parking services unavailable. Third, and
more importantly, driver’s sensitive information (e.g., name,
email address and phone number) and daily parking information
are stored in the database of smart parking systems, which has
the risk of privacy breach and data loss.
In contrast to existing centralized solutions, a promising
blockchain technology with advantages of decentralization,
security, and trust has been utilized for different applications.
A blockchain is a distributed, transparent and immutable public
ledger organized as a chain of blocks and managed by a set of
validators/miners [9], [10].
Motivated by this technology, in this paper, we propose
a decentralized and privacy-preserving smart parking system
using consortium blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to leverage blockchain technology to provide
decentralized smart parking services.
In our scheme, consortium blockchain created by different
parking lot owners is introduced. Each parking owner sends
his/her parking offers to the blockchain network, which records
the parking offers in a distributed shared ledger. To preserve
dirvers’ location privacy, we use private information retrieval
(PIR) technique to allow drivers to privately retrieve parking
offers from the blockchain nodes without revealing any infor-
mation to the nodes about the requested parking offers [11].
Short randomizable signature is used for authentication to allow
drivers to make parking reservations with parking owners in an
anonymous manner [12]. We run experiments to evaluate the
communication overhead and computational overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
network and threat models are described in Section II. Section
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III presents preliminaries. The proposed scheme is presented
in Section IV. Security and Privacy analysis are discussed in
Section V. Performance evaluations are conducted in Section
VI. The related works are presented in Section VII. Finally, a
conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
In this section, we presents the system and threat models.
A. System Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the considered system model has the
following entities.
• Offline Trusted Authority (TA). The TA is responsible
for initializing the whole system including registering
drivers, generating cryptography public parameters, dis-
tributing keys, and generating public keys certificates for
parking lot owners, so that they can get permissions to
write on the blockchain. In practice, the TA is a gov-
ernmental agency that is interested in the security of the
parking system, such as Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV).
• Consortium Blockchain Network. The consortium
blockchain network is the core of our proposed scheme. It
provides decentralized parking services. The consortium
blockchain network is made of authorized nodes, (i.e.,
parking lot owners). Specifically, it processes and records
all parking offers (transactions) on the shared ledger using
a pre-defined consensus algorithm.
• Parking Lot Owners (POs). POs are owners of parking
lots. Each lot includes IoT devices that collect available
parking information. POs then can publish their offers to
the blockchain network. The POs can be public or private,
e.g., residential parking or employees parking.
• Drivers. Drivers can use their smartphones to interact
with the system to find available parking spaces and make
online parking reservations.
B. Threat Model
We consider that the TA is fully trusted. Also, we follow the
standard blockchain threat model in [13]. Blockchain in our
proposed scheme is maintained by a set of validators/miners,
and trusted for execution correctness, but not for privacy.
The consortium blockchain is made of a group of parking
lot owners. In this model, we assume that at most t nodes
may collude during the private data retrieval process to infer
information about drivers parking locations. Also, at most b
nodes may return erroneous responses, which we refer to them
as Byzantine nodes. In addition, some drivers can be malicious.
For example, they may reserve multiple parking spaces for the
same time to prevent others from booking parking slots. Finally,
an external attacker can eavesdrop the communications in the
system to infer drivers’ sensitive information.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Short Randomizable Signatures
The short randomizable signature scheme has been proposed
in [12] to provide efficient anonymous authentication. It allows
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Figure 1: System Model.
a user to sign a message and randomize the signature several
times so that no entity can link that the received signatures is
generated by the same user. The scheme provides efficiency
and avoids the linear-size drawback of the traditional signature
schemes. We refer to [12] for the detailed construction.
B. Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
The PIR technique enables a user to retrieve or download
a specific data from a storage system without revealing any
information about the data being requested. This fits our model
as every driver (user in PIR) needs to query the blockchain
(distributed databases in PIR) for parking offers within certain
geographical area (cell) without revealing the driver’s interest
in a specific parking offer.
In this work, we adopt the PIR scheme in [11]. This scheme
is an information-theoretic PIR scheme for retrieving data from
MDS-coded, colluding, unresponsive, and Byzantine databases.
The reason we use this scheme instead of the capacity achieving
scheme in [14] is to avoid the exponential file size (in the
number of parking offers), which is needed to realize the
scheme in [11]. Furthermore, as the number of parking offers
become sufficiently large, the retrieval rate of [11] converges
to the capacity expression of [14].
By using the PIR technique, a driver privately retrieves
parking offers by sending queries to the blockchain, where
each blockchain node sends a response to the driver. The
driver reconstructs the desired parking offers by computing a
deterministic function from the received responses.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME.
Our proposed scheme consists of five phases: system ini-
tialization, submitting parking offers, parking offers retrieval,
parking reservation, and parking and payment.
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Figure 2: Nashville city, TN, USA is divided into
geographical areas (cells).
A. System Initialization
In the system initialization phase, the TA generates the
public key certificates for parking lot owners and anonymous
credentials for drivers. The TA runs the initialization for short
randomizable signature as follows.
Consider e : G1 × G2 −→ GT a cryptographic bilinear map
with generators g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, where G1 and G2
are cyclic groups of prime order p. Firstly, the TA generates
the public parameters (g1, g2, p,G1, G2, e,H). Then, it selects
randomly (x, y) ∈ Z2p as group secret key, where Zp is a finite
field of order p. After that, the TA computes (X˜, Y˜ )←(gx2 , gy2 ),
and sets the group public key as (g2, X˜, Y˜ ).
A driver D can register at the TA to obtain her credentials as
follows. She generates a secret key by randomly selecting a1 ∈
Zp and computes a public key A = ga11 . The driver randomly
selects a2 ∈ Zp , computes the pair (γ, γ˜)←(ga21 , Y˜ a2) and a
signature η←Siga1(γ). She sends to the TA (γ, γ˜) and η. The
TA verifies the signature η by checking e(γ, Y˜ ) ?= e(g1, γ˜).
Then, the driver invokes an interactive zero knowledge proof
of a2. After verification, the TA randomly selects k ∈ Zp to
compute
(σ
[1]
D , σ
[2]
D , σ
[3]
D )←
(
gk1 , (g
k
1 · γy)k, (gk1 , Y˜ )
)
(1)
The TA stores (ID, γ, η, γ˜) in its tracking list and returns
(σ
[1]
D , σ
[2]
D , σ
[3]
D ) to the driver. The driver sets her group secret
key as
gskD = (a2, σ
[1]
D , σ
[2]
D , σ
[3]
D ) (2)
B. Submitting Parking Offers
In this phase, each parking lot owner PO submits its parking
offers to the blockchain nodes. First, we assume the area A
(e.g., a city) where the smart parking is deployed, is divided
into small geographic areas, called cells, as shown in Fig. 2.
Then, a POj wishes to offer its parking spaces, it constructs a
blockchain transaction that includes the following information:
number of available spaces N , cell identifier C [m], public
key PKPOj , location loc, charging station availability in the
parking lot CS, price pr, and availability times tav .
Offer = {N,C [m], PKPOj , loc, CS, pr, tav} (3)
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Figure 3: Shared ledger format on each blockchain node
Note that submitting offers can be done routinely every specific
period of time (e.g., 10 min). Then, each transaction offer is
signed with the secret key of the POj and is broadcasted on
the blockchain network. Before storing the transaction on the
ledger, the validators of the blockchain network should verify
that the received parking offers are coming from an authorized
POj . Then, the blockchain nodes add the offers on the ledger
based on the cell identifier C [m], where m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, as
shown in Fig. 3. Specifically, for the PIR technique to work
efficiently, the parking offers in each cell is represented in the
form of L× 1 matrix on the ledger. Note that the same ledger
is stored in n blockchain nodes.
After submitting the offers, the transactions stored on the
blockchain should be validated by the blockchain validators,
and a secure consensus protocol should run by all participants to
agree on the content of the ledger. Specifically, the nodes run the
Raft consensus algorithm, which is used in quorum blockchain
of JPMorgan bank system. The Raft is a leader-based algorithm,
where the consensus is achieved via a leader election. The
leader is responsible for offers replication to the followers. The
Raft provides fast consensus time for the blockchain nodes.
Therefore, it is desirable for the realization of our scheme [15].
C. Parking Offers Retrieval
In this phase, a driver D wants to retrieve the parking offers
in the dth cell, C [d] = {C [d]1 , · · · , C [d]L } from the n blockchain
nodes without leaking any information (in information-theoretic
sense) about the identifier of the requested cell d. In this model,
we protect the privacy of the users from any group of t colluding
nodes even if there exist b Byzantine nodes that respond with
erroneous answer strings and r unresponsive nodes.
To that end, we assume that the size of the parking offers is
L = n − t − 2b − r without loss of generality. To retrieve the
offers in C [d], the driver D chooses i.i.d. and uniformly code-
words from a query code Cq , which is an [n, t] Reed-Solomon
code. The purpose of this randomness is to hide the identity
of the desired parking offers from any t colluding nodes. The
codewords can be represented as evaluations of a polynomial
βm` (z), where ` ∈ {1, · · · , L}, and m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. The
query polynomial, Qm` (z) can be written as:
Qm` (z) =
{
βm` (z) + z
n−2b−r−` m = d
βm` (z) m 6= d
(4)
Now, the driver D prepares the query to the jth blockchain
node by evaluating these polynomials at z = αj , where αj ∈ F
a finite field with sufficiently large alphabet (to realize the Reed-
Solomon codes). Hence, the query vector to the jth node Qj
is given by:
Qj =(Q11(αj),· · · ,Q1L(αj),· · · ,QM1 (αj),· · · ,QML (αj)) (5)
When the blockchain node receives the query, it uses
it as a combining vector to its content, i.e., the jth
blockchain node performs an inner product between Qj
and the vector of content (the parking offers) Yj =
(C
[1]
1 , · · · , C [1]L , · · · , C [M ]1 , · · · , C [M ]L ). Hence, the response of
the jth node is:
Rj = QTj Yj (6)
=
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
Qm` (αj)C [m]` (7)
=
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
βm` (αj)C
[m]
` +
L∑
`=1
αn−2b−r−`j C
[d]
` (8)
Eq.(8) can be written as an evaluation of the polynomial R(z)
as,
R(z) =
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
βm` (z)C
[m]
` +
L∑
`=1
zn−2b−r−`C [d]` (9)
To show the decodability, we note that the degree of R(z)
is n− 2b− r − 1, hence, the responses of the n databases are
codewords from an [n, n − (2b + r)] Reed-Solomon code. An
[n, n − (2b + r)] Reed-Solomon code is capable of correcting
b errors (which results from b Byzantine nodes) and r erasures
(which results from r unresponsive nodes). Therefore, with
applying Reed-Solomon decoding techniques, the driver D can
decode the parking offers C [d] correctly.
To prove the privacy, we note that the query code Cq used to
confuse the blockchain nodes is an [n, t] MDS code, and hence,
the distribution of any t queries is uniform and independent
from d in the same manner of Shamir’s secret sharing [16].
Hence, the scheme is private.
For the retrieval rate, the driver can retrieve L symbols from
n−r responsive nodes, consequently, the retrieval rate is given
by:
R =
L
n− r =
n− t− 2b− r
n− r (10)
D. Parking Reservation phase
In this phase, once the driver retrieves all the parking offers
within a specific cell, she starts the parking reservation phase
as follows.
First, the driver D generates a fresh public-private key pair
(PKD,SKD) and sends a reservation request to the selected
POj . The parking request includes all necessary information
for the POj , such as driver temporary public key PKD, parking
start time tDs , and parking period time t
D
p . Then, she computes
CrD = EncPKPOj (PKD, tDs , tDp ) (11)
where Enc is an asymmetric public key encryption algo-
rithm, e.g., using Elliptic curve. Then, she uses the short
randomizable signature scheme to generate a signature on CrD
as follows. First, she randomizes (σ[1]D , σ
[2]
D , σ
[3]
D ) by selecting
r1, r2 ∈ Z2p and computes the following values
(σ
[1]8
D , σ
[2]8
D , σ
[3]8
D )← ((σ[1]D )r1 , (σ[2]D )r1 , (σ[1]D )r1r2) (12)
cD ← H(σ[1]
8
D , σ
[2]8
D , σ
[3]8
D , C
r
D) (13)
s = r2 + cD · a2 (14)
where a2 is the secret used by the driver to generate
the gskD in the system initialization phase. Then, the tuple
(σ
[1]8
D , σ
[2]8
D , cD, s) represents the driver signature on C
r
D, de-
noted as SigD(CrD). Then, she sends both C
r
D along with
SigD(CrD) to the POj . Once the POj receives the parking
request, it verifies the signature SigD(CrD) to ensure that the
request is from a legitimate driver. The POj computes
V = e
(
σ
[1]8
D , X˜
)cD · e(σ[2]8D , g˜2)−cD · e(σ[1]8D , Y˜ )s (15)
Then, it verifies the signature by checking the following:
cD
?
= H(σ
[1]8
D , σ
[2]8
D , V, C
r
D) (16)
If it does not hold, the POj discards the request. Otherwise,
it decrypts CrD and proceeds to check the availability of the
selected parking. If the selected parking is available, it sends an
acknowledgement ACK message to the driver, i.e., the parking
space is still available and has not been reserved. Otherwise,
the POj sends NACK message if another driver has reserved
the parking slot. Then, after the driver receives the response,
she should send a down payment to confirm reservation using
existing cryptocurrecny systems that preserve privacy (e.g.,
bitcoin [17]). Using debit or credit card payment may reveal
sensitive information about drivers parking times and locations.
Note that the down payment discourages malicious drivers to
make multiple reservations at the same time.
E. Parking Phase
In this phase, the driver D arrives at the parking lot and the
payment for the parking is done. When she arrives at the POj ,
the POj should first authenticate that the driver was the one
who has made the parking reservation. This authentication is
done as follows.
First, the POj sends a challenge message Γ to the driver D.
Then, D uses the temporary secret key SKD corresponding to
the PKD that was sent in the reservation request to generate a
signature σSKD (Γ) and sends it to the POj . After that, the POj
verifies the signature. If it is valid, the POj allows the driver
to park in its lot. At the end of the parking phase, the payment
is also done by using an existing cryptocurrecny system. Note
that the down payment is a part of the payment.
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Figure 4: Communication overhead in parking offers retrieval
phase versus the number of parking offers per cell.
V. EVALUATIONS
A. Communication and Computation Overhead
To evaluate communication and computation overheads of
our scheme, we implemented the required cryptographic oper-
ations using Python charm cryptographic library [18] running
on Raspberry Pi 3 devices with 1.2 GHz Processor and 1 GB
RAM. We used supersingular elliptic curve with the asymmetric
Type 3 pairing of size 160 bits (MNT159 curve) for bilinear
pairing, and SHA− 2 hash function.
1) Communication Overhead: The communication overhead
is measured by the size of transmitted messages in bytes
between (i) a driver and the blockchain nodes (Parking lot
Retrieval phase), and (ii) a driver and a parking lot owner
(Reservation phase).
For the communication overhead in the retrieval phase, the
total downloaded data is calculated using the Eq. (17)
Total Downloaded Data =
n− t− 2b− r
R
(17)
Where n is the number of blockchain nodes, t colluding
nodes, b byzantine nodes, r unresponsive nodes, and the re-
trieval rate R is given in Eq. (10). Note that the upload cost for
the queries sent by the driver to blockchain nodes to retrieve
parking offers is ignored according to [11]. Note also that unlike
public blockchain where the number of nodes is very large, we
use consortium blockchain where the number of blockchain
nodes is small.
For the simulation, we considered t = b = r = 1, also
each parking offer by POj contains the number of available
parking slots N (2 byte), cell number C [m] (2 byte), a public
key PKPOj (20 byte), location coordinates loc (6 byte), a
charging station existence index CS (1 byte), a price pr (1
byte), a time availability tav (8 byte). So, the total size of a
parking offer is 40 bytes. Fig. 4 shows the total downloaded
data at the driver side with 44 blockchain nodes. In Fig. 4,
as the number of parking offers increase in a cell, the total
amount of downloaded data increases. However, the size of total
downloaded data is acceptable for smartphones where it is less
than 5 kbytes when the number of parking offers is 100 in each
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Figure 5: Communication overhead in parking lot retrieval
phase versus the number blockchain nodes.
cell. As per Fig. 5, as the number of blockchain nodes increases
at fixed number of offers, the total downloaded data decreases,
i.e., the data retrieval rate (R) is more efficient. This is because
the effect of Byzantine node is reduced, where we considered
that we have a fixed number of Byzantine blockchain nodes
(b = 1).
In the parking reservation phase, the driver reserva-
tion request contains: a ciphertext CrD, and a signature
(σ
[1]8
D , σ
[2]8
D , cD, s). The communication overhead is: 2 × 20 +
4× 20 + 2× 32 = 184 bytes.
2) Computation Overhead: The computation overhead is
measured by the time of cryptographic operations needed in
parking reservation phases. In the parking reservation phase,
the driver has to compute 1 Enc which requires 2 Mul, and
1 Add, in addition to a short randomizable signature that
requires 3 Exp, 1 Mul, 1 Add, and 1 Hash to generate a
parking reservation request. Therefore, the overall computation
overhead equals to 3 × 0.333714 + 3 × 0.000269 + 2 ×
0.000227 + 1 × 0.000227 = 1.003 ms
B. Storage Overhead Discussion
In this section, we discuss the storage cost overhead (i.e.,
size of parking offers) on the blockchain nodes. We suppose
that the size of block header and tailer is 80 byte, the size
of each parking offer is 40 bytes, each cell contains 50 offers,
number of cells is 39, and blocks are generated frequently every
10 minutes. Then, the size of the ledger after one year would be
(40×40×34)×6×24×365 = 3.6 GB. For these parameters,
we assume that the POs free up their storage on annual basis
to reduce the storage overhead. Note that the data content of
the blocks needs to be backed up and POs storage should be
released periodically.
C. Security/Privacy Analysis
Our scheme can achieve the following the security/privacy
preservation features.
1) Secure system without a trusted third party. Parking lot
owners can offer their parking spaces without reliance on
a trusted third party. Blockchain network is responsible
for managing parking offers made by untrusted parking
lot owners that make the system robust and scalable.
2) Location privacy. The location privacy of drivers is pro-
tected from blockchain nodes by using the PIR technique
during parking offers retrieval phase. In the parking reser-
vation phase, the drivers’ identities are preserved by using
short randomizable signature.
3) Reservation requests unlinkabilty. Given different parking
reservation requests from one driver at different times,
no one can learn whether these requests are sent from
the same driver or not. This is due to the use of short
randomizable signature to generate anonymous signatures.
In other words, a driver can use different random numbers
r1 while randomizing the signature (σ
[1]
D , σ
[2]
D ) on different
reservation requests. Moreover, the drivers’ privacy is
protected by replacing their real identities by temporary
public-secret key pairs during parking offers retrieval. Each
key pair expires once the driver sends a parking offer
retrieval request to the blockchain.
4) Authentication. The anonymous authentication security is
based on the unforgeability of the short randomizable
signature (σ[1], σ[2]), which is proved under LRSW as-
sumption 1 in [12].
VI. RELATED WORK
In the literature, different works have been proposed for smart
parking systems.
The schemes [6], [7] proposed a centralized privacy-
preserving parking reservation services. These schemes pre-
serve the privacy of drivers’ real identities using anonymity.
Also, they use location obfuscation techniques (e.g., geo-
indistinguishability and cloaking) to protect the drivers’ de-
sired destinations. However, the location obfuscation techniques
reduce the accuracy of selecting nearest parking during the
reservation process. They also disclose information on the
requested area for parking.
Ni et al. [8] presented a smart parking navigation where users
are guided by a cloud server and road side units (RSUs) to
available parking lots in their destination. The scheme mainly
preserves drivers’ privacy by using anonymous credentials.
However, hiding drivers’ real identities is not enough because
the cloud server can identify the drivers from their parking
locations. Moreover, the drivers reveal sensitive information,
such as current locations, destinations, and arrival times, to the
cloud server. This enables cloud servers to track drivers easily.
Different from existing schemes, we leverage blockchain
in this work to provide a decentralized parking management
services. Also, our scheme guarantees availability where there
is no single point of failure since it is managed by many peers.
In addition, the information-theoretic PIR scheme provides
absolute privacy guarantees in comparison with computational
guarantees [6], [7]. The used PIR scheme can mitigate b
byzantine blockchain nodes and r unresponsive nodes without
leaking any information about the requested offers to any set
of t colluding nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving smart park-
ing system using blockchain and private information retrieval.
A consortium blockchain is created by different parking lot
owners to store the parking offers on a shared ledger to
ensure security, transparency, and availability. To preserve the
drivers’ location privacy, we used private information retrieval
that allows drivers to privately retrieve parking offers from
the blockcahin nodes. To preserve the privacy of drivers’
identities, we used short randomizable signature to allow drivers
to reserve available parking slots anonymously and efficiently.
Our performance evaluations demonstrated that the proposed
scheme preserves drivers’ privacy with low communication and
computation overhead.
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